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PREFACE
The Agricultural Economics Research Unit is undertaking
research on the changing structure of New Zealand agriculture. Earlier
Research Reports have examined the history of land policy and recent
farm enlargement, and future topics include the subdivision process and
structural changes resulting from the new agricultural policies.
Research on agricultural structure provides an improved understanding
of both agriculture and rural communities, and contributes to effective
policy formation.
An important research issue is equity in landownership. In
this discussion paper, Dr Fairweather examines both social policy in
general and land policy in particular with a view to informing public
debate on land policy options. The paper brings a sociological
perspective to economic and policy issues in order to account for most
aspects of the land equity issue. Dr Fairweather refers to a theory of
social policy and examines empirical eVidence in order to suggest a
specific type of policy option which is reasonably justified. While
Maori land perspectives and issues are important, in the interests of
space and time, these issues are not addresed in this paper.
Whlle specific recommendations for policy are presented in this
Discussion Paper these take second place to the discussion of social
policy, property rights and the social consequences of ~oncentrated
landownership. It is hoped that the main contribution will be a better
appreciation of land and equity issues, and an informed approach to any
new policies.
R.G. Lattimore
Di rector
(i)
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SUMMARY
Two broad arguments are employed to justify proposals for a
government-sponsored closer settlement policy. The first argument
involves testing three different theories of social policy against the
pattern of New Zealand land policy history. The social democrat
position appears most relevant to New Zealand land policy and offers
one way of achieving justice in landownership distribution using an
active government role. The second argument involves an analysis of
property rights and the costs and benefits of farm enlargement. It is
concluded that non-landowners may be able to make a justifiable claim
against landowners who enlarge and generate adverse economic and social
consequences for the surrounding community. It is also concluded that
land policy should have as a major objective the goal of distributing
landownership among many people. Finally, a range of policy options is
presented which involve both positive steps to achieve closer
settlement and restrictions which would prevent land aggregation.
(v)

CHAPTER 1
LAND POLICY ISSUES
1.1 Introduction
The New Zealand landscape features divergent patterns of
agricultural and horticultural production. The different land uses in
different regions also reflect a temporal variation in which different
reg10ns have undergone varying degrees of change in production.
Different land uses are also related to different regional economies in
a mixed economy 1n which individuals or firms pursue their own
aspirations within the constraints of a market economy.
Superimposed on the variation in land use is variation in
landownership along three dimensions. First, intensive production
involves small areas of highly-valued land being owned by a relatively
dense populat10n of landowners, while extensive production has fewer
owners of larger areas of land. Second, within a given land use area
there are variations in the amount of land owned by landowners. Third,
there is variation in the proportion of the national population who own
rural land ana the 'area of land they own collectively. Today, the
number of rural landowners is a small proportion of the total
population. Like land use change, landownership characteristics change
over time as well.
There are a number of social issues stemming from the
non-homogeneous character of both land use and landownership. Variable
land uses and new technologies generate tensions over what land use
should be pursued. For example, there are questions of planning and
legal control of land use, and debate over forestry company land
acquisitions. There is an issue over whether regional assistance
should be provided and how it may be devised and administered, and
questions over what industries should be promoted. Regarding
landownership, there are questions of new farmer access to land,
appropriate size and efficiency, questions about the best form of
tenure, and debate about who owns farm land.
The issue of landownership distribution is the focus of this
Discussion Paper. Recent research shows that New Zealand farm
structure is evolVing towards a preponderance of both very small farms
and very large farms (Fairweather, 198bb). While the increase in the
number of small farms is a dominant trend, it is still the case that
many farms, especially tradit10nal pastoral farms, are increasing in
size. Survey results show that 1982 and 1983 enlargements involved the
addit10ns of significant areas of land to the original farms.
The present situation in New Zealand is one in which farm
enlargelilent resul ts in fewer owners of pastoral farms. Because farm
enlargement occurs on a significant scale, and because the area of
occupied land is relatively constant, it follows that there is a
decreasing number of traditional pastoral farms. It is also qUite
likely that enlargement will continue in the present environment of
financial problems for many farmers.
1
2The contemporary trends in farm structure raise important
questions. Is concentrated landownership a good thing? Do continued
enlargements provide economic benefits, and if so, to whom? Is
concentrated landownership conducive to equity and justice? The
answers to these ques~ions require lOOking at the economic and social
issues relating to property and landownership. For while it is
posslole to describe farm structure change, it is another issue to say
what should be done in response.
Another component of the land concentration issue relates to
the present law. The 1952 Land Settlement Promotion and Land
Acquisition Act sets out to promote closer settlement of farm land by
monitoring farm enlargements and preventing lI undue ll aggregation of
land. There is gOOd evidence that the Act is ineffective (Fairweather,
1985a) and the problem for policy is to assess what should be done in
response to an ineffective law. Current government proposals involve
abolishing the 1952 Act, and this makes the issue of land policy
particularly pressing.
This Discussion Paper examines social policy generally and
makes policy recommendations. Much attention is given to the theory of
soclal policy in order to clarify responses to the land concentration
issue. It is my belief that one's respon§e to the land concentration
issue is influenced by one's assumptions about both social policy and
the nature of society. It is important for everyone to be aware of the
impact of soclal pOllCy preference on policy formulation, for without
such awareness there will tend to be multiple responses to issues, and
lack of understanding ana appreciation of the full range of responses.
The analysis shows that a closer settlement policy can be well
justifled, and that there is a need for an actlve government role in
land policy in order to achieve fairness in the distribution of
landownership.
1.2 Equity, Justice, and Policy
Knowing wha~ to do about concentrated landownership and the
need for suitable law requires a land policy. Generally, land policy
addresses the concentration issue and such topics as tenure, land
ownership, and government plans for how land is obtained, distributed,
and used for benefit to the national economy and society. Land policy
is part of social policy in that it involves conscious intervention by
society to fulfil a public benefit so that society benefits rather than
some sections of society (Wilkes and Shirley, 19~4).
Any social policy is reinforced by an appeal to equity and
justice, that is, what is thought to be just, right, or correct.
Equity entails fairness over and above equality. An eqUitable
distributlon of something (e.g., land or income) takes full account of
all relevant factors to the distribution rather than accepting equality
as the sole criterion. With equlty, fairness is preserved or Obtained
and justice is seen to be done. For many, eqUity is II ge t t ing a fair
goll (Uavey and Koopman-Boyden, 1983).
The important question about equity is simply: on what basis
should economic goods and services be distributed? There are three
basic responses to this question, each involving a distinct view of
3justice. The three positions ~re classical liberalism, social
democracy, ana socialism. Each position includes a view of social
organization, economies, ana social policy. The objective of section
1.2 is to describe in full the three positions drawing on the works of
Ar~hur and Shaw (1978), Cole et al. (19~2), Room (1979), ana Wilkes
and Shirley (19~4).
1.2.1 Liberals and Libertarian Justice
Individual liberty is the prime political value to the
classical liberal. Under conservative liberalism, stemming from John
Locke and Adam Smith, is the view that individual rignts are paramount
and must not be transgressed by others. ~eyond this, no one is obliged
to assist other individuals and each person is left to fashion their
own existence. Past circumstances can create entitlements to things,
hence a distribution of land (for example) is just if it arises from a
prior just distribution by just means. Thus, one has the right to
acquire and dispose of property and can use personal talents for
individual gain provided the rights of others are not violated.
Libertarian justice implies a liberal view of economics which
is based on a subjective preference theory of value (Cole et al.,
19~3). Prices derive from the working of markets which are based upon
the actions of inaividuals seeking to maximise personal welfare.
Prices, consumption, and markets order a society which is the sum total
of all individuals. There is no inherent conflict in society when the
worKing of the market is unregulated; and social change results from
the development and acceptance of new ideas. The libertarian position
views economics as a distinctive discipline founaed upon principles of
the market. Typically, a positivist Philosophy is used ana normative
discourse is excluded from discussion. Typically, other disciplines
are seen as irrelevant to understanding economic processes.
For tne Liberal, the problem with social policy is that it is a
burden on society. Social policy is the product of sectional lobbying,
and it is costly and inefficient because it interferes with the market
allocation mechanism. According to libertarian justice the policy
options are clear. If the market is left to work then there is no
distribution issue because distribution is resolved in terms of
inaividual firm and consumer preferences. However, a minimal state is
necessary to maintain an orderly market. For example, the state can
attempt to control the money supply, prevent inflation, and maintain
law and order. The liberal view of society entails conservative
politics, and while the precise role of the state may be debated, the
general preference is to minimise state activity in both economy and
society. In essence, for the liberal, the market is the touchstone to
successful social organisation and there is no need for the state to
set out to achieve improvements in society.
It should be noted that the Libertarian position sometimes
involves reference to utility and utilitarianism. The latter basis of
justice involves the precept that the system of organisation which is
right is the one that promotes the greatest happiness (or utility) for
the greatest number of people. While a market system may be seen as
the means to achieving utilitarian aims, thiS is not the only system
which a utilitarian may promote. In essence, utilitarianism leaves the
4choice of economic system to empirical test.
To the existence of concentrated landownership, those with a
liberal persuasion would respond by denying that it was a major social
issue. Tney would emphasize the rights of landowners to pursue their
freedom to enlarge their farms, and look for evidence, or else assume,
that tnere were economic benefits for many people in the enlargement
process. The benefits of landownership are available to all those who
can own lana, and in many countries landownership potentially is
available to all. Any form of government intervention in landownership
coul a be an abr'j dgement of property r; ghtS. Dccas; ona l1y, some
liberals justify different levels of wealth in terms of individual
differences in the distribution of talent and ability. In general
then, concentratea landownership would be seen as a necessary part of
the economlC system.
1.2.2 Social Democrats and Social Contract Justice
Principles of social organisation deriVing from individuals
associating together are the fundamental starting points for social
contract Justice. Deriving from the ideas of Hobbes, Locke and
Rousseau, social contract justice involves hypothetical consideration
of the principles of organisation which would be agreed upon by
individual members of a society coming together for the first time. In
order to live in some kina of social order indlviauals coming together
agree to accept a h';gher authority in the state. Typical of social
contract theory is the idea that ir.dividuals coming together are
ignorant of their personal characteristics, endowments, and social
position. Inaividual and rational self-interest results in organising
principles which govern the sharing of social goods. The social
contract approach leads to the principle that all social values (e.g.,
educational opportunities, voting rights etc.) be distributed equally
unless an un~qual distribution is to everyone's advantage. With social
contract justice the basic structure of society is of primary concern.
In contrast to liberals, social contract theorists accept the
independent and possibly prior existence of the state.
Soclal contract justice implies a dlstinctive set of economic
models which are based on a cost of production theory of value (Cole et
al., 198~). Following Riccardo, value is seen as deriving from
production and is influenced by technology and the distribution of
profit between managers and workers. There is the possibility of
conflict within society because these two groups vie for a proportion
of the value of production. Social change derives from the evolution
of technology, and normative discourse can be included within the
economlCS discipline. The policy options stemming from social contract
justice include judicious state interventions in the economy. First, a
neutral and pluralist state is necessary to resolve competition between
groups and to harmonize competing interests, and second, state
interven~lon in the economy is necessary to redress imbalances in
distributions. Stemming from this view of policy is social democracy
as a system of political organlsation.
For social democrats, social policy formation is, or should be,
a product of the action of the populace in partnership with
legislators. The state can provide a basis for a cohesive society and
5overcome sectional divisions. With this view the importance of the
market is downplayed, and individual's prospects are seen to be
influenced by both the market and by state legislation. Certain rights
are considered important ana upheld by the state so that basic needs
are satisfied. Explicit in this view is the idea that the market
cannot, even in principle, allocate resources to satisfy basic needs.
However, the policy process is not devoid of conflict because policies
are chosen and pursued in response to support among the population at
large. Policy development is open, with future directions
indeterminate and a proauct of the policy formulation process. Central
to the social democrat view is the fact that contemporary social
organisation involves the state as a major component of society.
The social democrat perceives concentrated landownership as a
case where inequity and injustice may exist. The uneven distribution
of lana is examined critically to see whether it is justifiable, for
there may be benefits to all in having concentrated landownership.
I~either absolute property rights nor the existing land market are
acceptea unquestioningly. If changes to landownership distribution
were desired then government intervention would be acceptable.
Concentratea landownership is seen as a possible case where the land
market is an entirely unacceptable basis of distribution.
1.2.3 Socialists and Socialist Justice
Equitable participation in the economic arena is a major
objective of socialist justice. Present distributions are unjust and
strong actions are necessary to solve the basic problems of class
division. Stemming from r<icardo, aavocates of socialist justice
emphasize class divisions in modern society and seek egalitarian
dlstribution of economic goods and services. Strong actions may
involve restriction of liberties but this is justified since capitalism
erodes the freeaom of a large class of people.
Socialist justice entails an abstract labour theory of value
(Cole et al., 19d3). Value derives from the social relations of
production coalescing around two classes owners of means of
production and workers who sell their labour. There is fundamental
conflict between these two classes in any society organised through
markets of commodities, including labour. Social change is a product
of class conflict. Economics is historically specific and changes in
aifferent epochs; scientific valiaity is defined in terms of success
in promoting social change so that outcomes and results are given
emphasis.
Social policy from the socialist point of view emphasises that
there has been no funaamental change in the organisation of society
since the origin of capital ism in the mia-nineteenth century. Class
conflict and capital accumulation are the main dynamics of contemporary
soclety.and social justice ana equity can only be obtainea by
revolutionary action on the part of workers to ensure economic
equality. Existing social policies merely distribute working class
incomes or serve the interests of the capitalist class. Thus,
socialist justice involves an attack on the market of labour power.
Socialists would perceive concentratea landownership as an
6example of the inequalities that develop under capitalism. They would
point to the workings of the land market as a factor in the
exploitation of the majority of non-landowners. The institution of
property would be seen as inherently unjust because it results in the
exclusion of many people from ownership of lana. Radical policy steps
would be neeaea to change the funaamental organization of property and
lnsure that most citizens obtained benefit from landownership. Tne
state mayor may not form part of the radical restructuring process.
1.2.4 Evaluating Respective Posltions
Eacn of the three positions described above involves a aistinct
account of how society is best ordered, how society develops and
changes, how aistributions are justified, and how social policy is best
implemented. Also, each position has a aistinct response to the land
concentration issue. It is a mistake to dismiss anyone position as an
extreme formulation, especially on the groundS that they are
caricatures. The above presentation has portrayed each position in
ideal type terms which accentuate the main characteristics of each
position. Actual writers or proponents of any social policy would only
approximate anyone position to a greater or lesser degree. Most
contemporary views on social policy have one of these positions as a
foundation.
It is al so a mistake to see the three positions as simply a
continuum of attitudes to change. For example, one could argue that
liberals are merely conservative and want the present order unchanged,
social democrats want a little change, and socialists want major
change. However, it may be that liberals in a society with many
socialist attributes want significant changes back to market capitalism
and they would then advocate considerable change. It is true that
liberals prefer the status quo as it approxlmates the original form of
capitalism, and that soclalists want to change completely away from a
society organized by classes. In this sense there is a progression
from acceptance to rejection of a market organized society.
At this point, once the existence of three positions is
acceptea, the interesting question is: can one position be supported
as best or most appropriate? The literature illustrates a number of
responses to this question. Cole et al. (1983) present the three
types of economics associated with each position and make no attempt to
argue for the priority of anyone position. Indeed, they emphasize
that empi ri ca1 tests cannot be used to choose the IIcorrectll theory
because the core propositions exist prior to, and influence, the
collection of facts. Thus. there is no suitable crucial test of
theory. Neither is logical rigour a suitable criterion for selection
because each theory is consistent within its own terms. Wilkes and
Shlrley (1984) work with a similar typology and make little attempt to
establish a priority to any pos'ition. However, their definition of
social policy, and their concern to see policy analyses become aware of
tne relationship of policy to social structure, suggests a preference
for the socialist position. Most importantly though, they emphasize
the question of who actually benefits from any policy - whose interests
does the policy serve? Awareness of this question can provide one
basis from which to evaluate alternative policies, if only to show that
other policies clearly do not. serve the general interests they purport
7to.
Finally, Room (1979) goes further than both Cole et al. and
Wilkes and Shirley and argues for the priority of the social democrat
position. His argument is that the liberal and socialist theories of
poliCy emphasize capitalist development, each position focusing on a
particular aspect of social organization. These aspects are the market
and the devaluation of workers respectively, and each aspect of social
organisation takes society to a particular end. However, the social
democrat position is open to the direction of development and eschews
the teleological attributes of the rival positions. Room justifies his
position by reference to an interpretation of BritiSh social policy.
Since each position involves a theory of social policy itself, both in
its original form in the nineteenth century and in its present form,
then each posltion makes claims about the nature of social policy.
These characteristics are subject to empirical test. The outcome of
Room's evaluation is qualified acceptance of the social democrat
position because ltS view of social policy best fits the existing
patterns of development.
In essence, Room goes beyond Cole et al.'s equivocal position
by attempting to apply empirical tests to respective positions. Room
emphasizes theories of social policy ana their r.elationship to social
organisation and social change. Thus, the viability of each theory is
evaluated by reference to what has occurred in the pattern of social
policy. Room argues that liberals and socialists have to establish
that empirical changes in society are only superficial and that their
respective observations and form~lations based on nineteenth century
capitalism are relevant to today. Close attention to contemporary
social policy shows that the belief that changes in society are
superficial is hard to sustain. A corollary of the liberal and
socialist positions is that the social democratic position and
interpretation is erroneous. Room's analysis and interpretation of
major elements of social policy provide good evidence in support for
his argument.
This Uiscussion Paper adopts a similar approach to Room and
examines New Zealand land policy as one area of social policy in order
to evaluate the three positions. The social aemocrat position appears
to be the most appropriate perspective on land policy.
1.3 An Interpretation of New Zealand Land Policy
A summary of the main points of each perspective on social
policy will De useful before giving an interpretation of New Zealand
lana policy. Liberals argue that the justifications accorded social
policies are a cloak for the operation of sectional interests. Policy
makers are influenced by lobbyists so that there is no scope for
genuinely useful policy. Socialists argue that social policies are
"selected" in the interests of capital so that workers are exploited
further. Excessive weight is given to the needs of owners of means of
production so that social policies redistribute wealth from wealthy
workersto poor workers. Both the liberal and socialist views imply
that citizens are reacted upon by the policies deriving from either
lobbying or class processes. The state is seen as an instrument of
speclal groups. Social democrats argue that social policy can, but
8will not necessarily always be, a procuct of citizen interaction with
legislators. There can be successful policy if there is good citizen
representation in the policy formulation process. Social policy can
intervene in the market and achieve desirable ends.
Agricultural Economics Research Unit Research Report No. 165
provides an account of New Zealand land policy and its effectiveness.
That report snows that land policy has attempted, and succeeded, in
promoting closer settlement of farm land. The impact of land policies
was greatest up to 1921 when settlement policies contributed
significantly to the increase in the number of farms. Both before and
after this period of maximum influence, land policies were not as
significant. However, it is fair to say that the government pursued an
effective closer settlement policy up to 1956. It has to be recognised
that government policy was not the only factor involved in closer
settlement because there was private subdivision of large-scale estates
at the same time as state-funded subdivision. Also, a proportion of
the increase in farm numbers derived from increases in the area of
occupied land.
The state went to considerable lengths to foster closer
settlement. In large part this was due to a change of government in
the 1890 l s which involved an attack on large-scale estate owners. At
issue was the distribution of farm land among the population. The
closer settlement policy hastened, but was not the sole cause of, the
change from estates to commercial family farms, and the policy provided
consiaerable opportunities for landless farmers. The predominant mood
of the time was democratic and egalitarian. However. closer settlement
pOllCy haa a material motive in addition to the pursuit of democratic
ideals. It was believed, and probably for good reason, that small
family farms made a major contribution to lncreasing agricultural
production.
By 1913 there was legislative concern with aggregation of
farmland. laws were introduced to prevent individuals from staying on
farms that were very 1arge, and the Ivli ni ster of Lands was empowered to
acquire farmland by compulsion if the owner refused to privately
subdivide or negotiate a sale with the government. Closer settlement
policy later in the twentieth century maintained these provisions, and
also attempted to achieve other social oDjectives such as relief of
unemployment and returned servicemen settlement. Present-day land
policy maintains state powers for the purchase of farmland for
subdivision.
The above brief analysis of government land policy can be used
as a basis for evaluating which view of justice and equity has most
relevance to New Zealand land history.
Past land policy, with its concern to achieve closer
settlement, appears to have been based on a social contract conception
of equity. An overriding norm was equality of opportunity, and the
objective was to provide opportunities for landless farmers to enter
farming, ana later to own their farmland. Land policy was a reaction
to large-scale estate production in which a limited number of persons
owned large areas of land. The closer settlement POllCY rejected the
colonial gentry society which was based on concentrated landownership,
and it sought to foster an egalitarian society where even the smallest
9farm would sustain a meritaole status for its owner. New ideals of
working the land, independence and self-employment became established
in the early twentieth century and persist today.
Past land policy rejected the market as the sole mechanism for
the allocation of land among the population. While there was a market.
this was influenced by government policy as the state purchased land,
subdivided it. ana settled landless farmers. Closer settlement policy
worked parallel to the land market and did not dominate it; ther~ was
also private subdivision and land development. In general, the state
recognized the existence of the land market and took major steps to
influence it in order to achieve both social and production objectives.
The social contract justice which underlay the formulation of
closer settlement policy may have replaced what could have been a
libertarian Justification for concentrated landownership. It seems
valid to assume that estate owners believed that their right to large
areas of land was morally justified. They bought it and developed it
using their talents and resources, and they resisted talk of
egalitarian distribution of landownership. For them. the concentrated
distribution was a product of privilege and their special place in
society. Hence, during much of the period of the colonial gentry,
voting riyhts were extended only to property owners. Also, there is
good evidence that early large-scale landowners manipulated land
leglslation to their own advantage. giving support to the socialist
position on land policy. In large part. the colonial gentry pa~tern of
concentrated landownership was a carry-over of Wakefield's theory of
colonization in which landownership was to be limited to few people and
there would be many people available for manual work.
The social contract view of justice and its social democracy
position seems to be the most appropriate perspective on past New
Zealand land policy. Not only were the conception of justice and
actual land policies in accord with the social democrat position. but
the alternative interpretations of land policy do not fit the evidence
very well. Land policy was more than a product of sectional lobbying,
and it drew on majority support espeCially after 1892. Neither was
land policy a product of a dominant class as the socialist perspective
would argue. In fact the dominant landowning class of the nineteenth
century failed to control land policy, and land policy did provide
access to the land for the landless. i.e., workers. However. some
elements of the socialist theory of land policy do apply. The state
did attempt to alleviate the working class condition during the
de~ression and thereby mitigate the consequences of class conflict.
However, this policy was a minor part of land policy generally. Also,
some elements of land policy favoured existing lanaowners; e.g., the
granting of the freehold as opposed to maintaining state leaseholds.
It appears that the state was unable to maintain control of the
"unearned increments" in land value.
Despite the inability of the state to maintain widespread
leaseholds it remains the case that land policy was a product of a
large and significant government bureaucracy with a considerable degree
of autonomy. General goals of equity in landownership were pursued by
government officials with support from broad sections of society,
despite class aifferences.
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However, the above interpretation of past land policy in New
Zealand is weakened by the priority it gives to philosophical position.
While events may lend themselves to plausible interpretdtion, this does
not mean that such philosophies underlay the actual motivations for
change. For while equality of opportunity loomed large in the land
policy debates of the 1890s it remains the case that liberal freedom to
own farmland became popular by 192CJ. At this time a new government
facilitatea change from leasehold to freehold. Thus, the main approach
to land policy appears to have been one of political pragmatism over
doctrine. The flux of government power was based on policies that
worked rather than policies which conformed to a dominant philosophy.
Hence, there is the curious irony that ideas from the European left
have become entrenched into conservative liberalism (Wynn, 1984). That
is, individual freedoms to own land were linked to the idea that this
coula apply to all rural dwellers. The rights of property were linked
to the puOlic good so that welfare was maximised. Another linkage to
socialism shows up in state leasehold legislation.
In general then, I~ew Zealand land policy drq.ws from multiple
philosophies as these were assumed under pragmatism. It is not clear
to what extent the early land legislators were aware of theories of
equity and justice. Individual freedom has been given importance and
the freedom has been extended widely. Freedom of opportunity has had
much emphasis;"so that many citizens had a chance to get a slice of the
benefits from landownership. Hence the active role of the state was
found acceptable as it facilitated the process and ensured equality of
opportunity. To some extent then, land policy has reflected some
elements of all three theories of justice.
While pragmatism guided land policy it remains the case that
there has been a significant role for the state in land matters
generally. Between 1876 and 1891 a single state emerged from the
provincial system, and this national state implemented a significant
land policy administered by a number of government departments. With a
succession of closer settlement strategies, the state became a major
force in the pattern of land settlement. Land policy thus derived from
active state involvement in land matters, especially with respect to
equity and efficiency issues. It is this view of the state and land
policy tnat is most accurately portrayed by the social democrat view of
justice and equity. Land policy in New Zealand is best accounted for
by the social democrat position.
1.4 L~na Policy at a Turning Point?
While closer settlement policies earlier this century helped to
generate an increase in the number of farms~ this pattern has not been
consistent since 1951. From 1951 to 1971 there was a steady decline in
the number of farms (Fairweather, 1985b) which suggests that an
emphasis on production via farm enlargements was more important than
closer settlement policy. Since 1971 there has been an increase in the
number of smallholdings at the same time as enlargement of larger-sized
farms.
Present land policy is based on the 1952 Land Settlement
Promotion and Land Acquisition Act which attempts to prevent undue
aggregation of farm land. The Act specifies the conditions under which
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a proposed land purchase is contrary to the public interest. However,
the Act is ineffective and little used (Fairweather, 1985a). Further,
the Lands and Survey farm settlement scheme, a policy which has had a
minor impact on farm numbers, has been suspended recently. Thus, land
policy at the present time is largely a carry-over from the past and
ineffectively pursues closer settlement at the same time as
landownership concentration is increasing. Further, there is at
present little debate about landownership distribution and related
issues involVing justice and equity.
Contemporary land policy may be at a turning point as earlier
principles are forgotten or are replaced by new principles. There is a
hiatus in the development of land policy as old solutions no longer
apply to current farm structure changes. Further, in the absence of
well-directed land policy the alternative approaches can appear
plausible. For example, socialists could argue that ineffective land
law favours existing landowners at the expense of workers or non
landowners, and that land policy should move to broaden landownership
via fundamental changes to private freeholding. Social democrats could
argue that ineffective land law favours eXisting landowners at the
expense of workers or non landowners, and that land policy should move
to broaden landownership via fundamental changes to private
freeholding. Liberals could argue that ineffective law is an
illustration of an ineffective and inefficient policy brought into
place by successful lobbying. The solution would be to minimise state
intervention and to let the land market resolve dlstribution prOblems.
The evidence from the abcve interpretation of past land policy
belies the simplicity of the socialist and liberal response to the
current situation. Both positions ignore the history of land policy in
New Zealand and fail to account for two observations. First, New
Zealand society appears to have adopted a social democrat position on
the land concentration issue. Thus, there is a strong precedent for
continuing with land policies based on the social democrat position.
Land history snows that the state can intervene in the land market in
order to achieve both gains in productivity and improvements in equity.
The New Zealand experience illustrates the potential of the social
democrat position. Second, the above interpretation of New Zealand
land policy suggests that alternative views on land policy are not
valid. Proponents of either alternative position have to deny the
above interpretation of land policy or show that it is seriously
flawed. In effect, they have to deny that the State can have a major
and independent effect on the distribution of land.
In conclusion, Chapter 1 has provided a basis for understanding
the depth of the land policy issues surrounding land concentration.
Arguments are presented in support of the social democrat position.
before developing the implications of the social democrat position for
policy recommendations, the next chapter considers additional arguments
relevant to evaluating the respective positions.

CHAPTER 2
SOME COSTS AND BENEFITS OF LAND CONCENTRATION
2.1 Introduction
Chapter one establishes that there are at least three possible
main types of response· to the issue of lana concentration. Each
position has a distinctive formulation of what is a just and equitable
distribution of land among the population. Each position argues that
its formulation is the best for society both in terms of economic
development and for the general public good. It is this belief that
requires some empirical evaluation, and this chapter musters available
evidence on the economic and social consequences of the trend towards
.concentrated landownership.
While land concentration is the general focus of this
Discussion Paper the specific focus is farm enlargement as the process
which leads to concentrated landownership. Property rights form the
basis of the present chapter. The first section analyses property
rights ana shows what is at stake over conflicts of interests.
Property rights are examined first before going on to evaluate, where
possible, the costs and benefits of farm enlargement. In general, this
chapter shows major weaknesses in the liberal response to the land
concentration situation, leading to the conclusion that the social
democratic position is the better basis for land policy.
2.2 Property Rights and Conflicts of Interests
Property is a social arrangement which delineates the rights
and duties of all members of society with respect to valuable assets.
There are three dimensions to property arrangements: the asset itself,
its owners, and all possible claimants to the asset.
An important issue which underlies the debate about justice and
equity in landownership is the responsibilities of landowners. Of
concern are the respective rights of landowners and non-landowners.
The concept of a right does not apply to society but rather to
indivlauals (Bromley, 1982) although the state can define one set of
interests in any property rights conflict as worthy of protection.
When protection is afforded to a set of interests, rights have been
established for the property owners. However, non-lanaowners can come
into conflict with property owners in three ways: when there are
externallties which have an adverse economic effect on neighbours, when
1andowners I ti me preference for resource use confl icts wi th others, and
with situations which involve both externality and temporal effects.
There are two situations which exist in any property rights
situation (Bromley, 1982). First, a right can exist which necessitates
a duty from another party. A's right is Bls duty, and in a given
situation A can expect B to behave in a certain way. For example, A
can expect B to respect property and for B not to take any of the
benefits of ownership. A's rights, defined by law, protect a set of
interests. Second, a privilege can exist which involves no right. A
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has a privilege and is free to act but B has no right to have A act
oth~rwise. For example, A may have the privilege to deposit waste in a
river, apply pesticiaes to weeds on a property or grow trees which
block a neighbour's solar collector. Thus, with property rights there
are the two correlates of rights and duty, and privilege and no right.
Conflict over property rights involves conflict over the
allocation of rights and priVileges. In many cases, someone desires to
change a legal situation from priVilege to duty. In the case where A
has priVilege to spray, B wants A1s privilege to spray to become a duty
not to spray in a way that kills bees, for example. That is, B wants
the right to have his bees protected. What is at issue i~ this
conflict is the absence of rights to a party which suffers a cost
deriving from an external effect of another's activities. Changing
technology leads to new situations arising where existing law does not
satisfactorily protect interests. Over time there is constant
reaefinition of boundaries.
The structure of property rights or entitlements is the primary
determinant of how social costs get accounted for by the conflicting
parties. A given set of entitlements means that important social or
economic costs may be unaccounted for by one party and forced on
another party. Conflict occurs over who pays the costs. In the bee
example where A has right to spray, B has to suffer any cost that might
result in the case of poisoning. If B already has a right, A must bear
the cost of preventing damage. Many contemporary conflicts can be seen
as debates over who pays for the external cost. For example,
non-smokers now are asserting their interests and seeking legal cha~ges
which ensure their rights and imposing on smokers the duty not to smoke
where it conflicts with non-smokers· wishes. Previously, smokers had a
privilege whiCh entailed no rights for non-smokers. Similarly, those
who suffer crop damage or ill health by herbicide spray drift from
careless neighbours seek to restrict such irresponsible behaviour and
obtain compensation. Where agricultural odours decrease urban land
values, residents seek to change the landowners' priVilege and impose
on them the burden of controlling the odour. Finally, where landowners
bear conservation costs which benefit the wider community, a case can
be made for the community to bear some of the cost (Johnson, 1970).
There are some important observations relating to the above
property rights analysis. The solution to property rights claims
cannot be made by an independent cost-benefit analysis which might show
which allocation of responsibilities is least costly. Mishan (1981)
demonstrates that the outcome of cost-benefit analysis typically is to
support the status quo, and is dependent on the type of law Which is in
existence. Where liberal noise pollution laws exist (i.e., laws which
permit noise) the existing situation appears to be optimal.
Conversely, where noise is banned, cost-benefit analysis favours
existing laws. In fact, with a permissive law, initiatives for change
are unlikely because there would be limited benefit and the widely
dispersed victims would risk high costs in any attempted legal action.
A restrictive law would engender an individual or company initiative
with no personal risk of high cost.
Mishan's analyses also shows that the voluntary agreements
which are apparently pOSSible unaer a liberal approach are not
symmetrical in all respects. This is, proponents of liberalism argue
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that it is immaterial who has property rights initially because they
would be re-assigned according to a market process whereby rights were
bought and sold. For example, if smokers were poorer on average then
distributional considerations would confer a right on smokers and leave
it to non-smokers to bribe smokers not to smoke. However, this
approach ignores ethical issues ana favours one group (the smokers) at
the expense of the other (non-smokers). The action of smokers
decreases the freedom and welfare of non-smokers but the action of
non-smokers does not, in itself, decrease the welfare of smokers. The
property rights conflict in the smoking situation is initiated by the
smoker and is therefore not ethically symmetric. Thus, property rights
should be held by innocent parties and restrictive laws should apply,
so ensuring that the level of welfare of innocent parties is maintained
rather than that of the prod~cers of externalities.
When it comes to property in land, some of the conflicts over
equity and justice can be seen to relate to the correlates of
right/duty and privilege/no right. The three different positions have
a different response to the issue of externalities. Liberals emphasize
the rignts of landownership and the duty of non-landowners to accept
those rights. The liberal position emphasises the freedom of the
indiviaual to own land and obtain the rights of landownership. Since
the number of landowners is limited it follows that landowners have
rights which non-landowners do not have. Non-landowners have to accept
landowners' rights, and should seek to own land themselves if they want
to have rights with respect to land. In the extreme case, any social
or economic costs which derive from a landowner's deciSlon have to be
accepted as a right because the costs of intervention outweigh
potential gains. In the extreme liberal view, pollution, run-off, and
all off-site consequences of an agricultural enterprise should be
accepted by others as a duty. In general though, while liberals may
accept that these off-site costs exist, they will tend to resist any
change in the balance of responsibility because placing the burden of
the costs on the landowners would be perceived as an attack on the
freedoms and rights of landowners. Any modification to property rights
would be an abridgement of individual freedoms, which are of paramount
importance to the liberal. Further, liberals would argue that
non-landowners can buy off landowners and otherwise bear the costs of
achieving what they consider a desirable outcome. For example,
neighbours can pay a farmer not to spray.
Alternatively, social democrats would give some emphasis to
non-landowners' claims on landowners. Tnus, off-farm consequences of
landowners' decisions could be seen as a social and economic cost to be
borne by the landowner where such an allocation were judged to be fair.
Social democrats woula not accept property rights as unqualified rights
to De asserted in every conflict situation. They would look to the
overall impact on society and would uphold the rights of non-landowners
who faced unreasonable burdens from landowners. Social democrats would
emphasize the need to enforce the rights of non-landowners and the
duties of lanaowners. Property rights would still be adhered to
although there would be some limitation on these rights. Finally,
social democrats are sceptical that desirable outcomes in the case of
externalities can be achieved by buying off landowners. They would
point out that the ability of victims to pay for change is often far
less than that requirea to be effective.
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In the extreme case, the socialist position would involve
removing the property rights of any individuals and forming a system of
social organisation in which all persons in society had a similar claim
to land. Socialists would seek to change the system of property rights
in a fundamental way and obviate the problem of externalities.
2.3 Farm Enlargement and Purported Economic Gains
The above property rights analysis clarifies what is at stake
in property conflicts. The main issue at present is to decide how to
respond to the existence of externalities. There is a need to clarify
what criteria can be used to resolve competing property rights
interests. Typically, such issues have been resolved by reference to
such criteria as economic development, equity, and social stability.
The following discussion begins by adopting the economic development
criterion ana examines the costs and benefits of concentrated
land-ownership. In particular, the aim is to respond to the liberal
position which can react to externalities arguments in one of two ways:
by denying the existence of externalities, or by arguing that any
externalities are outweighed by gains from farm enlargement. The next
section examines these liberal responses and throws doubt on the claims
that externalities are insignificant and that farm enlargement provides
economic benefits for the nation. The discussion follows contemporary
biases and focuses only on the liberal and social democrat positions to
the exclusion of the socialist position.
The liberal Vlew implies that the freedom of individual
property rights ultimately lead to maximum welfare for society. The
essential liberal belief is that unfettered landownership rights
resolves the land distribution issue and, because the market is an
efficient way of organising society, generates maximum wealth for the
maximum number of people. For 11berals, the right to enlarge ones
holoing in land is a basic right which, when preserved, provides
benefits for society. The most cited benefit is that farm enlargements
enable farms to become "more efficient". It is important to understand
precisely what this means.
Leathers and Gough (N.V.) examine a hypothetical scenario of
decreasing farm size (by subdividing the largest 25 percent of farms)
and generating a 51 percent increase in the number of farms. They find
that gross revenue increases by 20 percent, efficiency in the use of
agri cul tura1 resources decreases by three percent, and on farm
employment increases by 11 percent. This disaggregation scenario
creates 51 percent more farms. The authors point out that these
findings tend to de-emphasise the importance of economic efficiency in
lieu of other policy objectives. It is important to note that the
possible ~O percent increase in gross revenue or production does not
match the 51 percent increase in numbers of farms and presumably farm
incomes would suffer. Further, increased productlOn may lower product
prices. ThUS, the problem becomes one of sustaining adequate farm
income under the disaggregation scenario. The data align with the
observation that farmers may increase farm size to improve farm income
but not necessarily to improve production per unit area.
A
supporting
simulation study of U.S. farm size goes some
the above observations. Schatzer et al. (1981)
way in
examines
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farm size trends in U.S. agriculture under a number of assumptions.
With both the existing trend to increased farm size and an alternative
of larger increases in farm size, there is an increase in net farm
income. The increase is larger under the large farm scenario.
However, aggregate U.~. net farm income is larger under the trend farm
size. Schatzer et al. also find that the large farm scenario when
combined with an increase in productivlty, results in smaller net farm
income in the aggregate and per farm values than for the existing farm
size trend. Hence, in terms of policy, Schatzer et al. note that
increases in productivity from research and extension expenditure
results in lower food prices but would be devastating for U.S.
farmers. The alternative policy of maintalning present levels of
research and extension expenditure results in a larger economic pie and
a larger slice for farmers. A policy of increasing farm size increases
the size of the slice; a policy of maintaining present farm size
increases the size of the pie.
There are some similarities in the results of both of the above
modelling studies. Although Schatzer et al. did not study
disaggregation, their results support those of Leathers and Gough.
Aggregation in both studies increased the size of the slice; the
alternatives (disaggregation, or existing farm size trend) increased
the size of the pie. In general, both studies show that the
single-minded approach of emphasising the importance of farm
efficiencies can have high costs. For Leathers and Gough the costs are
large decreases in employment in agriculture for a small gain in
efficiency; for Schatzer et al. productivity increases cheapen
consumer food prices but devastate farm incomes. Both studies show
that a broad perspective, one which includes social factors, is
necessary in any farm structure policy decision.
Other research denies the existence of straightforward economic
benefits from farm enlargement. Jenson (1984) examines farm size data
in Saskatchewan to show that constant returns to size are the norm for
the industry and that farmers increase size to improve net income only.
Jensen's positions fits in with the results of the simulation research,
and he broadens the analysis to relate farm size issues with general
distribution issues. Jensen emphasizes that small farms can be as
efficient as large farms. Because rural depopulation affects
publicly-funded schools and hospitals in Canada, the farm size question
is of concern to all. Further, any benefits directed to the
agricultural sector go to fewer people if there is farm enlargement.
Again, it becomes a public issue concerning the aistribution of
benefits. Jensen advocates removing policies which favour large farms
ana that any income redistribution be directed towards individuals not
firms. Jensen suggests a number of measures for limiting farm size,
for example, progressive land tax, research and development for small
farm machinery, and legislation to limit farm size in proportion to
some amount of an input or the total amount of output.
The efficiency benefits of farm enlargement are the subject of
some debate (Fairweather, 1Y85b), and there is the question of their
relevance to New Zealand conditions. However, it is clear from the
international literature that the existence of significant economies of
size are questionable, especially for average and larger-sized farms.
There is agreement that economies of size are gained early in the
transition from small to medium-sized farms. It is quite likely that
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these conclusions apply to the New Zealand situation. The study of
farm enlargement in New Zealand (Fairweather, 1985a) shows that
motivation for farm enlargement is not governed solely by
considerations of economic efficiency ana that the available New
Zealana literature on economies of size supports the overseas findings.
Also, McLean (1978J observes that New Zealand efficiency gains in
agriculture have been achieved mainly through reducing the labour input
per uni t of production. rather than by increasing production per uni t
area of land.
The view that farm enlargement is desirable because of
productivity gains is unwarl"anted. The freedom to enlarge carries not
a necessary economic gain but a possible economic cost. If it is true
that enlargement is efficient only in the sense that it improves farm
income then the liberal claim that land market resolution of land
distribution maximises benefits to society is wrong. It is more likely
that landowners benefit from farm enlargement ana non-landowners bear
any costs of declining total farm pr'oduction. This conclusion
parallels the results of a Canadian stuay of the urban real estate
market (Gunton, 1983) where it was found that free markets in land do
not lead to efficiency. equity, or stability. In fact free markets
resulted in unstable prices, inefficient allocation of lana and
infrastructure, and inequitable allocation of profits from land
development.
,.4 Other Costs Associated With Farm Enlargement
In the debate over property rights issues, one of the liberal
responses is to deny that farm enlargement carries with it external
costs. This section examines the available literature which, for the
U.S. at least, shows that farm enlargement does result in adverse
social effects. It is argued that farm enlargement has adverse social
consequences in New Zealand.
Overseas literature shows much greater awareness of the social
costs of farm enlargement than in New Zealand. There is a wide body of
research which aescribes changes in agricultural structure and the
policy issues arising from these changes. This overseas literature
illustrates both the extent to which farm structure is an important
social issue and the recent advances made in agricultural policy and
land policy. In the absence of a comparable bOdy of research in New
Zealand, it is left to us to infer that this research has relevance to
the New Zealand situation. Relevant New Zealand literature is
presented at the ena of this section.
Farm structure change is well stuaied in the United States.
Tne last two decades has seen much effort directed at describing
changes in farming ana examining the impact of the changes. In 1979,
the U.S.V.A. publishea an extensive collection of papers in a book
entitled Another Revolution In U.S. Farming? which set out to discuss
changes in farming which "may· be as far-reaching as the earl ier
revolutions" (Schertz et al., 1979: v). The main changes include
transformation in the organisation and management of U.S. farming with
changes in the size of farms, form of ownership, use of capital goods,
and changing incidence of risk and credit. In 1981 the U.S.D.A
published another book entltled A Time to Choose: Summary Report on
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the Structure of Agriculture which focused on the policy implications
of changes 1n agn cu I ture. Stemmi ng from the same concerns expressed
in the above two books is the position that it is now time to
re-evaluate agricultural policy because recent changes in farming mean
that existing policies, founded on an earlier form of agriculture, are
no longer relevant. As Lee (1983:3) puts it, it is time to examine the
IIconsequences of the new reality in U.S. agriculture. 1I Thus, recent
changes in U.S. agriculture have generatea a body of research which
seeks to describe the changes and to discuss the implications of these
changes for policy.
Among the recent changes in U.S. agriculture are fewer, larger
farms which produce the majority of total agricultural product. At the
same time there is a large number of economically less important
small-scale farms (including part-time farms). Also there is a growing
international dependency on U.S. food production, a broadening
constituency to food policy issues once considered external to farm
policy, and a growing sensitivity to unintended side effects of
agricultural policies.
A major theme of U.S. research is the concern with the
occurrence of fewer larger farms. Heady (1983) argues that policies
and conditions that favour economic development of agriculture favour
large farms. Hence, among the policy considerations are ways to remove
programmes which encourage large farms and to modify existing
programmes to decrease the level of support as farm size increases.
Conversely, progressive property taxes are proposed as a strong
restraint on the growth of IIsuperfarmsll.
The serious attention given to policy review has been sustained
by wide-ranging research. One topic which has generated much interest
and follow-up research is Goldschmidt's (1947) study of two towns in
the Central Valley of California. Goldschmidt examined the effects of
farm scale on rural community viability by selecting contrasting towns:
one with large-scale farms and the other with small-scale farms.
Gol dschmi dt argued that the communi ty wi th small, owner-operated farms
had a much higher level of individual and collective well-being than a
community with large farms. The original research has been criticised
for methOdological failings (Goss, 1979; Sonka, 1979) and a recent
study shows that other factors were involved in the retarded
development of one town (Hayes and Olmstead, 1984). Other recent
studies caution against uncritical acceptance of Goldschmidt's thesis
(Harris and Gilbert, 1982; Nuckton et al., 198!). Generally however,
Goldschmiot's findings have been accepted and his work has had an
important bearing on social science research on agriculture because it
raised the question of the impact of farm structure on community
(Buttel, 1984).
Much literature pursues themes basic to the Goldschmidt's
research. For example, Poole (1981) challenges the traditional
pre-1970's View that large-scale farmers have higher levels of
participation in the rural community by finding an inverse relationship
between farm scale and family social participation. As a result of the
research findings Poole suggests revisions to the dairy price support
scheme so that larger producers are not disproportionately benefited.
In addition, the trena to a bimodel distribution in Wisconsin dairy
farm size from 185U to 1950 prompts Nofz (1983) to challenge
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traditional notions of the benefits of scale ana efficiency and to
appeal for an assessment of non-economic values in farm policy
formulation. Another tack within the body of research which seeks to
describe and evaluate the impacts of farm structure changes is to
discuss the consequences for landownership. Molnar and Korsching
(1982) argue that in the short term t managerial abilities will improve
as the least efficient proaucers go out of business, but in the long
term t wealthy heirs may enter agriculture while potentially valuable
managers will be lost from the industry. However t this observation
assumes that corporate farm ownership precludes a continuous flow of
managers onto a given property. The above examples show some of the
lines of research which have been undertaken as researchers examine the
consequences of farm size change.
Other research provides some detailed analysis of how farm size
change effects regional development. For example t Tass et al. (1981)t
using a cash flow accounting method t showed that potential retained
yields per acre generally declined as farm size increased. Further t
small labour-intensive irrigation technology generated 37 to 40 percent
more estimated after-tax income and hired workers' wage payments. An
important process at work was the fact that large-scale farmers
bypassed local suppliers and made a larger contribution to federal
taxation t both of which detracted from regional development. In a
review of the relevant literature t Buttel (1983) argues that aside from
the clear economic gains captured by a shrinking group of large-scale
farmers t the social consequences of U.S. farm structure change are
adverse. Specifically, the economic activity of rural communities
undergoes a downward multiplier of decline as farms enlarge beyond
family-based enterprises. Buttel also evaluates U.S. rural
development strategies and argues that they are wanting in
effectiveness.
A strong argument for land reform in the U.S. is made by
Schader-Trenchette (1984) in dn effort to achieve desirable regional
econOllJic deve%pment. The main point is that concentrated and absentee
landownership results in capital leaving the region. The resulting
stagnant economy is a social cost of concentrated landownership.
In addition to the above research there is a growing body of
literature which examines the impacts of agricultural policYt on farm
structure. This interest may have been generated by the U.S.D.A.
publications in 1979 and 1981. One dependent variable of interest is
the rate of growth of farm size. Eginton (1983), in a stUdy of federal
fiscal and monetary policies, found that interest payment write-offs
had the greatest effect on the rate of farm size increase. Similarly,
rate of growth in size and after-tax net worth were found to be higher
for farm corporations than for individually-owned farms (Moje t 1983).
It follows that scale economies and agricultural commodity programmes
whose benefits are linked to output levels help to explain increase in
farm size. Another study (Smith t 1982) found that in the absence of
farm prograinmes structural changes tended to a bimodel distribution
whereas existing programmes benefited mid-sizea farms. Finally,
Eginton (19~O) founa that substantial real capital gains could be made
Dy farmers oriented to expansion at the expense of current savings t and
Richardson and Condra (1981) found that projected chances of farm
survival and success increase as farm size increases. The literature
thus shows that many policies have been directly related to farm size
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increases.
The farm structure and agricultural policy situation in Canada
is similar to that in the United States. As in the United States, the
Canadian Government set out to stimulate discussion of farm structure
issues with Structural Change in Canadian Agriculture: A Perspective.
This book questions how farm structure is changing, why, and what
difference does it make and to whom. The dynamics of farm enlargement
occur in Canada too. Bollman (1983) discusses changing farm numbers
and their implications for policy. Similar to U.S. research, Jensen
(1984) makes a strong case against existing policies which favour
larger-than-family farms. His research questions the existence of
economies of size with farm enlargement and his data show that
increased size results only in increased farm income.
Turning to Europe, there is less literature relevant to the
contemporary issues of farm enlargement. Typically, European problems
relate to the lack of farm enlargement because their farm structure
features many small farms which appear to operate inefficiently.
However, the structural situation in the United Kingdom has been
reviewed (Britton, 1977) and there are many regional studies. For
example, Edwards (19&U) examines the Central Somerset area and argues
that generalised structural data mask complex patterns of farm size
adjustment and occupancy patterns. Naylor et al. (1982) show that
between 1967 and 1977 amalgamations were common on medium-sized farms.
In addition, regional development issues have been addressed in some of
the empirical work. Bird (1982) examines the effect of large private
ownership on parish development in Scotland to show the existence of
concentrated landownership. Further, Bird argued that the landowners'
decisions continued to have a significant impact on potential for
growth or decline in rural settlements in spite of powers accorded to
local and national boaies. Finally, one cross-national study found
evidence to show that tenancy, and the character of its provision, was
related to farm enlargement and the rapidity of farm structure change.
The above overview of international agricultural change, and in
particular farm structure change, shows that in the U.S. and Canada,
contemporary agriculture is changing quite rapidly and the change is
fostering close attention to agricultural policy. A major theme of
U.S. research is a concern that the trend to large farms has adverse
effects on the rural community. Further, there is good evidence that
large farms are disproportionally favoured by agricultural policies and
that there are few national benefits from aiding large farms. In
response to these findings new ideas for agriculture are being
examined. These include policies to modify existing programmes so that
they favour smaller farms rather than larger farms, and revising
policies which were originally designed to foster the family farm but
have been co-opted by larger-than-family farms. Other policies have
involved specific programmes for rural development.
The general point of the above research is that farm
enlargement can have adverse economic and social effects. The research
has monitored the impact of farm enlargement along a variety of
dimensions. The result of the research is a general acceptahce that
new policies are needed. The U.S. now has specific new policies which
address some of the issues. However, despite the findings, current
U.S. policy is resulting in rapid decreases in the number of mid-size
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farms. Attention is now given to the New Zealand situation.
There are some good reasons to expect that the adverse effects
of farm enlargement found overseas can be found in New Zealand.
Although perhaps not to the same degree, there are clear signs that New
Zealand agriculture is changing in a way that is similar to that in the
United States. While we still have many farms which appear to be
traditional family farms, there is a growing proportion of partnerships
whi ch may si gnify a 1arger-than-farnily organi zati on of production. In
addition, the expanding horticultural sector includes many farms which
have social organization characteristics of large-scale industrial
production. Frequently, ownership is separated from production, and
production involves groups of wage workers rather than family labour.
These signs of change in farm structure, when combined with the fact
that farms have been enlarging recently, indicate that New Zealand
agriculture is subject to the same dynamics as U.S. agriculture. It
is also the case that agriculture in the U.~. and in New Zealand has
many similarities. For example, both countries have modern production
systems and significant agricultural exports. It is possible that the
New Zealand rural community has experienced adverse consequences from
continued farm enlargement in the same way as in the U.S.
It must be emphasized however that there is little data to
support the case that these changes have occured in New ,Zealand.
Little research has been directed towards examining the changes in
organization of prOduction or the consequences for the rural community.
However there has been attention given to rural depopulation, and the
link to farm enlargement has been made. Barker and Brown (1980) note
that there is no simple causal relationship between enlargement and
depopulation. They point out that there is regional variation in
population trends so that while the long-term trend is for national
rural depopulation, there are now areas where there is rural
repopulation. Possible causes of depopulation include economic
factors, rural sector changes, and farm level changes which include
farm enlargement.
Some New Zealand evidence fits the thesis that farm enlargement
may have adverse effects. It appears that small farms have a desirable
record of achievement with respect to erosion. They are able to handle
environmental ana erosion problems. With state assistance, it was the
family farm which began to attack soil erosion problems in the 1940's.
Large farms with non-family ownership may be less suited to long-term
care of soil. Very 1arge farms may not permi t the mai ntenance of a
close relationship between the farmer and the land. It also appears
that in New Zealand history small farms based on a broad distribution
of landownership are conducive to social stability. Concentrated
landownership in the late nineteenth century was a major factor in the
instability which preceeded the formation of family farms. Thus, New
Zealand agricultural hlstory supports the view that family farms with
diverse landownership can adopt soil erosion control programmes
successfully and can provide community stability.
While there is no significant research on the adverse
consequences of farm enlargement in New Zealand, there is a widespread
belief that rural depopulation is linked to farm enlargement. The
Planning Council·s review of rural change (1982) develops the rural
depopulation theme and notes that the rural community believes that it
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is disadvantaged by the trend to larger farms and the decline in the
number of farm Jobs. Economic rationalisation of service industries,
combinea with aepopulation, leads to a further decline in rural
services. In addition, farm surveys (Pryde, 1985) show that a majority
of respondents believe that if farm enlargement were to continue this
would be undesirable for agriculture. Further, most respondents (63
percent) think that there is a relationship between farm size increase
and decline in rural jobs, businesses and services, while 27 percent
think that there is no such relationship. While the relationship
between farm structure and rural community in New Zealand is poorly
documented, there is widespread belief that farm enlargement has
adverse social consequences.
In the absence of New Zealand research, it is the position of
this paper that it is reasonable to infer that the U.S. research is
relevant to New Zealand. If the liberal argument against externalities
were to have significant verity then it would apply to the U.S.
situation as well. For the liberal to argue that the two cases are
different is to adopt an ad hoc argument and to fail to account for why
adverse consequences could be found in one case and not the other.
2.5 Conclusion
The property rights analysis provides a useful structure from
Which to evaluate the costs and benefits of farm enlargement. Property
rights issues involve the problem of externalities. The available
evidence shows that the liberal response to externalities is
unjustified. That is, the liberal cannot claim that freedom to enlarge
maximises the benefits to society as a whole. First, there are social
and economic costs which are a consequence of land ownership and farm
enlargement. Second, there is little national benefit from the freedom
to enlarge. The liberal claim that maintenance of property rights
benefits all in society appears to be unsound. Liberal freedoms do not
rnaintain the public good. In addition, the weight of evidence suggests
that because landowners' decisions have off-farm consequences then
there can be grounds for intervention by the state to ensure that
landownership does occur in such a way as to benefit society. ThUS, it
may be justifiable to convert a priVilege/no right situation into one
in which rights are granted to non-landowners. These rights would
entail obligations for landowners. It is the incorporation of
non-lanaowners' rights into the land policy issues which entails an
active state role in some kind of social democrat formation.
In addition, it is justifiable to intervene in the land market
so as to ensure that landownership is distributed among many people
rather than few. In this way closer settlement of farm land ensures
that the benefits of landownership are made widely available. One
particular benefit is windfall profits. Since the existence of such
increases in lana value derive from the presence of community, then it
is equitable that the community obtain a share of any windfall profits
that it helped to create. In New Zealand history the idea of windfall
profits was referred to as the 'unearned increment' in land value.
ThUS, in either of the above two ways, that is by extending rights to
non-landowners or by closer settlement policies, an active role for the
state is requirea in any meaningful land policy.
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A point needs to be made about the role of technology. Often
it is assumed that technology forces farms to enlarge. That is, where
once one set of technological conditions were adequate, now a new set
requires bigger farms. The problem with this view is that it reifies
technology and ignores the economic and social context of fal"ming which
underlies the need to take on new technology. Technology by itself
cannot cause farm enlargement because it merely provides the technical
means for farm enlargement. Another important point is to realize that
any position which supports small farms or non-concentrated
landownership need not be an advocate of traditiona'j technology. In
fact new technology is essential to small farms. What is being
questioned is the scale of new technology.
The present chapter shows that tne social democrat view of
property rights is justified by the available research. This means
that privileges may be changed to duties depending on the analysis of
who benefits from a given property arrangement, and that closer
settlement of farmland is a desirable goal. The property rights
approach supports the conclusion of Chapter 1 that the social democrat
position on equity, justice and land policy is the most appropriate for
current land policy. With respect to property in land it seems
appropriate that the state is needed to ensure equitable land
distribution and to minimise social and economic costs for
non-lanaowners where these genuinely occur. It is not the case that a
free market in land with minimal state role is appropriate. To some
extent, an active state role in a social democrat formation is very
necessary.
CHAPTER 3
POLICY ALTERNATIVES
3.1 Introduction
In Chapter 1 the social democrat view of justice as it applied
to equity in landownership was proposed as most relevant to the current
land concentration issue. The argument took the form of examining the
theory of social policy which was associated with each of three
perspectives on the distribution of land. My interpretation of New
Zealand land policy history supported the social democrat view of land
policy. The intention of Chapter 1 was to prOVide a detailed
background to land policy and to present a range of perspectives on
equity in landownersnip. Chapter 1 also described land policy in New
Zealand as at a turning point because present land policies are
ineffective and there is uncertainty over future directions.
Chapter 2 took a different tack to support the social democrat
response to land concentration. The property rights analysis
juxtaposed the claims of property owners and non-property owners over
the burden of unmet economic and social costs deriVing from management
decisions involving fa~ enlargement. The general point was made that
a liberal approach to property rights unfairly favours property owners
in attempting to preserve their rights to unimpeded land management
practice. Empirical material, largely derived from U.S. research,
showed that there are adverse consequences from farm enlargement. It
followed that a land policy based on social democratic principles was
the better response to land concentration. The existence of unmet
costs also means that non-landowners can argue legitimately for some
kind of restrictions on the right to enlarge. Thus land policies which
foster closer settlement can be justified because closer settlement can
mitigate the adverse consequences of fa~ enlargement and have positive
economic and social benefits. In addition, closer settlement can
broaden the distribution of benefits from ownership of land.
The present chapter presents a range of policies which can
foster closer settlement. The proposals lnclude both restrictive or
negatlve policies which limit property rights, and positive policies
which support closer settlement. The main purpose of this chapter is
to suggest some possible policy options and not to provide definitive
solutions. First, it is necessary to establish the precedent for land
policy.
3.2 The Long History of Land Policy
In discussions of land policy it is sometimes believed that
interventions are mere epiphenomena to the fundamental processes of the
land market. It is also believed that interventions are a recent
occurrence, added on to a land market that originally operatea without
restrictions. However, it must be recognised that the idea of some
limitations on property rights has a long history. As far back as
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classical Greek history there have been discussions on the amount of
land which ought to be owned by anyone person (Barker, 1957).
Aristotle discussed ideal states and arguments for the regulation of
property in order to prevent civil discord. He was responding to
suggestions by Phaleus of Chalcedon for equal property ownership, and
suggestions by Plato that property ownership should be unrestricted up
to the point where the size was five times as large as the smallest
property owned by any other citizen. Aristotle describes cases where
restrictive laws were enacted. However, Aristotle argues against the
prima facie virtue of equality of property because the amount owned may
be too large or too small, either situation causing problems. Hence,
for Aristotle it is more important to equalize men's desires and
further, to consider the role of political office as well as property
in the causes of civil discord.
However, Aristotle does not reject the general idea of equality
of landownership and at a later point argued that a democracy based on
a farming populace is the best possible form of social organisation.
It is important to realise that the land policy options considered then
included restrictions on the absolute amount of land owned, laws
preventing the sale of family allotments of land, and laws preventing
raising a mortgage on a certain portion of a property. Another law
involved subdividing properties into sections allowing even the
smallest landowner a right to vote.
The above examples show that land policy had an early
beginning. Later periods in history also feature debates over similar
land issues. With resp_ect to New Zealand history, the same conclusion
applies. In fact, the plans for colonisation were founded on a clearly
specif1ed policy regarding who would own land. Since the colonial
period, land policy has always been an issue and at no point was there
an unfettered land market from which state interventions were
consciously excluded.
3.3 Support for Smallholding and Intensification
Among the first policy options to be considered are those that
support and foster small holding. The argument here is that if
concentrated landownership is undesirable because of adverse effects on
the rural community, then policies which foster smallholding can be
justif1ed because they will tend to reverse the trend to concentrateo
landownership. Left unexamined is the issue of to what extent closer
settlement po11cles should be pursued. Obviously there is a limit on
the amount of resources to be invested in smallholding.
As suggested earlier (Fairweather, 1985a) an effective closer
settlement policy is one that follows changes in farm structure. With
the current trend to small holding it appears that land settlement
should involve new types of intensive production rather than
traditional pastoral land uses. An experimental approach could be
adopted so that assistance was provided for the establishment of
sma11 nol dings in sel ected areas. The Lands and Survey Department cou 1d
undertake this experiment with a view to developing a national
settlement schen~ which fostered small holding settlement.
An important aspect of government support-for smallholding is
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hat such assistance can help producers overcome the costs of changing
their type of production. In the past, the government has readily
suppor~ed such changes realising that the initial costs would be
outweighed by the returns from intensified production. In addition,
such productivity gains were matched by an improvement in landownership
distribution as intensification facilitated an increase in the number
of producers. It is quite possible that the pastoral industry is in
another phase uf intensification which could be facilitated further by
government involvement without a loss on the investment made. While
private investment may aChieve the same productivity gains it is
unlikely that private investors will have any concern for landownership
distribution. In fact, there will be a tendency for private investors
to monopolise their land holdings and where possible to avoid paying
the full social cost for commodities they produce.
In general, the main rationale for a smallholding policy is to
avoid the adverse effects of the farm enlargement process by increasing
tne number of very small farms. It is possible that encouraging
intensification is in the national interest because total value of
production may improve. A smallholding policy would foster family
farming. If government policy helped new entrants into horticultural
proauction, for example, then family ownership would be promoted.
Family farming of horticultural products could be a desirable adjunct
to closer settlement because it would help maintain diversity of
landownership. It remains the case, however, that fostering small
holdings can have only a limited impact on land concentration because
the areas of land are small.
3.4 Policies Which Would Help to Keep Farm Size Down
Along with family farming in horticulture, there is also the
possibility of family forestry. Instead of the government or companies
owning extensive areas of land, it may be possible and desirable to
have smaller units on which the owner-operator undertook forestry
management. Perhaps state leaseholds could be arranged in which a
yearly farmer income could be provided until harvesting began. It
appears reasonable to avail on the state to help establish family
forestry and provide collective security to the developing forestry
assets.
Related to government closer settlement policies is private
subdivision of farm land. A recent example of subdivision involved one
farmer selling half of hlS home farm to finance partnerships for three
young farmers (Keenan, 1985). The farmer bought a large property and
subdivided it himself into three economic units, each run by a young
farmer under his supervision. Benefits included personal satisfaction
and increased prOductivity. Any government closer settlement policy
must recognise that private subdivision is also possible, and in fact
could be assistea in some way.
A clearly defined closer settlement policy would influence
agricu-'tural policy. Typically, past problems have been resolved
temporarily by increasing scale without giving attention to
lntensification on eXlsting pastoral farms. As some case histories now
suggest (e.g., the Press, 1985) the current economic crisis can be
coped with by concentrating on profitability per area and per stock
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unit. An alternative approach to the "get bigger ll response is
illustrated by other farmers who overcome the high cost of machinery by
employing more people and using more of the existing medium-scale
machinery (Crabbe, 1978; Broad, 1984). In the past, the option of
increasing scale tends to be a typical and popular solution which is
promoted. For example, in 1985 drought-stricken small-scale farmers
are seen as only having tne option of selling their farms and allowing
neighbours to buy parts of the farm. The alternative response of
facilitating larger farms to subdivide and provide the additional land
needed for the smaller farm is seldom considered. In other words
adjustments can be made which achieve improved efficiencies and sustain
farm numbers. A related strategy is to relieve the aebt burdens of a
group of farmers in one area by selling off parts of their farm and
forming a new farm.
Part of the re-orientation of agricultural policy to the land
concentration issue involves the scale of technology. New technology
will always be needed but it need not always be based on increasing
scale. There is a social' and economic dimension to the technology
issue. First, increased awareness and concern for land concentration
can make farmers 1ess enamoured of buyi ng the 1atest and 1argest
equipment. Second, machinery write-offs tend to disproportionately
favour large-scale equipment over small. The write-offs could be
modified to provlde an equitable incentive based on a per farmer
calculation.
Another policy option involves modification to the provlslon of
supports to farmers. It is time that recognition was given to the fact
that any support policy, whether it be a subsidy or a service, has a
distributional effect: larger farmers get relatively more of the
support. However, there may be dubious gains to society from providing
assistance to farmers who are already large-scale. It is likely that
most of the present collective resources are received by larger farmers
since present policies tend not discriminate in terms of recipient farm
size. An alternative policy is to provide supports in inverse
proportion to farm size so that as farm size increases, relatively less
support is provided. In this way, agricultural policy is more likely
to promote family farming rather than be co-opted by larger than family
farms. While this policy involves the difficulty of measuring farm
size, it would still be better to address the issue rather than
avoiding it and accepting eXlsting policies which are insensitive to
size.
In addltion, lending finance can be directed towards favouring
small farms. Preference can be given to farmers seeking to bUy small
farms, and loans not given to farmers seeking to enlarge farms, except
in tnose cases where it is clear that enlargement is necessary for the
farm's survival.
The adoption of Philpott's (1976) productiVity - subsidy/tax is
another policy which appears to favour less-concentrated landownership.
Philpott has proposed that traditional taxes and subsidies be removed
and that anyone farmer's productivity be compared to average
productivity, and a tax or subsidy applied accordingly as an incentive
to improve production. Philpott believes that these changes would tend
to reduce land values and reduce the incentive to farm for capital
gains. In aadition, intensive land use would be encouraged and land
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not well-managed but owned for capital gain would be sold. Further,
according to Philpott farm enlargements would be discouraged because
they do not usually result in greater productivity per unit area.
3.5 Alternative Land Tenure Systems
One problem with freehold tenure in the absence of capital
gains taxation is that farmers can farm for capital gains instead of
farm1ng for production. Freehold allows the landowners to gain all the
increases in land value as the price of land inflates. The expectation
of land price inflation generates high demand for land and provides an
incentive for land concentration. Changes to alternative land tenures
coulo reouce the role of farming for capital gains. Another problem
with freehold land tenure is that a fixed cost is incurred in servicing
the purchase arrangements. This will influence farm profitabil1ty
especially when tne returns fall. Alternative land tenures cQula
provide flexib1lity in response to changes in land market prices, and
with leaseholds, for example, the rents could be aajusted according to
returns. Freehold locks farmers into bUdgeting for a fixed value of
land, ana changes 1n product prices cannot be reflecteo in land value.
Land trusts are an option tnat may ensure capital gains are
used in the community. The Land Trust (Buttel, 1983) is a non-profit
organisation with an elected board of trustees. Farmers or forest
owners sell the oevelopment and transfer rights of their land to the
land trust in exchange for use rights and insulation from the effects
of 1nflation and land speculation. The land is removed from the
speculative market and is leased to individuals, families,
co-operatives or others as a lifetime or inheritable ninety-nine year
lease. The trust board has the power to decide land use and revoke a
lease if land is misused. The purpose of the trust is to allow farm
famil1es to capture the increasing value of their land as their rents
decrease in proportion to those on the market. Land price inflation is
reduced under the land trust system.
Another land supply option is to aoopt a new kind of state
leasehola in land. Newman (1985) proposes that the Crown lease land
with five-year rent review. The lease would be renewable until the
leasee bought anotner property, reached age 60, died, or surrended the
lease. The leasee would provide stock and plant. In effect, this
proposed lease is a sharefarming arrang~nent with the Crown providing a
kind of large stepping-stone unit. The farms would be farmed for
maximum profit and may provide access to farm land ownership elsewhere,
or provide satlsfaction for life-long work to those who accept that
they cannot pass the land on to a son. The major cost of land purchase
would be avolded by the individual leasee and borne by the taxpayer.
However, capital gains would accrue to the Crown. This proposal fits
the social democrat view of equity because it recognises that the
benefits of landownership include a component which should benefit all
citizens rather than speclfic landowners.
A quest10n here is where will the land come from? One possible
source is from farmers who cannot sell their farms. If the present
decline in land prices continues then there may be farmers willing to
sell to the Crown at a conservative price. Such land could then be
used for the five year lease. Such a role for the Crown has already
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occured before when estate profitability was declining. Large-scale
estate owners offered land to the Crown between 1893 and 1941 when
estate profltability was declining. It may be possible to subdivide
the present farms that sell because an economic unit would have a mUCh
diminished land cost in the form of an annual rental and therefore
require less production per farmer in order to sustain economic
Viability. At the same time total productivity may increase as
production intensified.
Some of the early comments on the freehold land tenure system
made by Belshaw (1947) are still relevant. Belshaw pointed out that
wiaespread freehold facilitated waste of land resources and erosion,
and prevented efficiencies in development costs which could be obtained
by large-scale state development. Also, in Belshaw·s opinion, there
were excessive land transfers with a freehold system and this resulted
in over-mortgaglng. Again, there was the problem of private
appropriation of unearned increment in land value, an increase which
derived solely from the presence of a community. For B~lshaw an ideal
land tenure system was one that would provlde an incentive to farm
well, avoid waste of the land resource, provide gooa size and security,
eliminate private appropriation of unearned increment and land
speculation, and would yield wage rates comparable to non farm
occupations. The solution was for government to develop and own farms
on whicn the leasee operatea according to specified standards. Leases
could be transfered among family members and the value of improvements
det~rmined and obtained by the leasee at expiry of the lease. Belshaw
hoped that this form of state leasehold would increase farmers· welfare
and the effectlve use of land in the interests of the community as a
whole.
In addition to state leaseholds, there is the possibility of
applying newly-adopted home ownership schemes to rural land. The two
new schemes are equl ty-sharing and sweat equity 1endi ng pol icies. With
the former scheme, the Housing Corporation provides a loan ana in
return, recelves a share of any capital gain on the property if it is
sold. Mortgage repayments are set at 25 percent of gross weekly income
and the borrower pays interest at three percent plus the rate of
inflation. The mortgage requires a low deposit and can be up to 90
percent of the property value. With the latter scheme, modest income
families rent a house from the corporation and undertake renovations.
When the renovations are completed the tenant is given a chance to buy
the house using their labour as a deposit. Both schemes if applied to
farming would help young farmers enter farming. The equity-sharing
scheme could be used to keep mortgage repayments in line with farm
income, and it would encourage farming for production rather than
capital gains. With the sweat equity scheme, the state could buy run
down farms on which tenants could undertake improvements using there
own capital. Once the improvements had reached a satisfactory level an
arrangement for purchase could be undertaken.
3.6 ~ossible Changes to the 1952 Land Settlement Act
Existing law attempts to scrutinize land transactions involVing
farm enlargements. The law is ineffective and yet requires
cons i derab1e admi nistrati on costs. There are two responses to thi s
situation: either change the law or abolish it. Merely abolishing the
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law, while there are benefits from saved administration costs,
overlooKs elements of the present law which may be useful to retain.
For example, the provisions for state acquisition of private land for
subdivision are useful features of the legislation which may meet a
future need but do not cause any problems at present. Changing the law
might be desirable if ways can be found to make if effective.
Despite the apparent enervation of the 1952 Act, it could be
strengthened. For example, with improved awareness of motivation for
farm enlargement, combined with careful monitoring of enlargements, it
may be possible for the Land Valuation Tribunals which scrutinize land
transactions to use a stronger approach to the decision regarding an
enlargement. More careful scrutiny of each transaction may ensure that
there 1S a greater proportion of enlargements for genuine economic
reasons. The Act could be strengthened by ensuring that the Tribunal
is an informed and representative group of rural citizens. Bringing
farm land purchases under the scrutiny of a broad group of people may
be justified glven the arguments in Chapter 2 regarding the social
consequences of farm enlargement. However, broader scrutiny raises the
problem of deciding which groups are represented on the Valuation
Tribunal.
A more radical step is to modify the law so that it prevented
most enlargements except those that were minor boundary adjustments or
those that were economically necessary. To achieve this original
intention of the 1952 Act, the burden of proof could be reversed. At
present, the Crown has the burden of proof having to show that an
enlargement is undue aggregation, otherwise the enlargement can
proceed. A more effective approach would be to prevent all
enlargements until the landowner showed that enlargement was necessary
in order to maintain income and farm viability. There would still be
problems with this innovation because farmers may be able to present a
compelling case regardless of their true economic position. However,
reversing the burden of proof would provide a disincentive to enlarge
and also provide better information from wnich to decide if an
enlargement should proceed.
3.7 Taxes and Limits on Farm Size
Another lana market intervention policy is a direct capital
gains tax. Taxes on capital gains could reduce the incentive to
enlarge farms. While all landowners would face the tax, if property
speculation decreased then the capital gains would be proportionately
less. My recent stUdy of farm enlargement during 1982 and 198j showed
that one third of all enlargements were motivated by a desire to
achieve capital gains. A capital gains tax might be effective at
reducing the number of enlargements. There are many issues regarding
capital gains tax, inclUding what rates would apply and when the tax
would be levied. Another variable is the question of 'rollover', i.e.,
applying the tax only when the gain is realized not when a farm is sold
to buy another farm. For the moment only the principle of a capital
gains tax is considered.
The full use of a capital gains tax would mean that when farm
land prices fell, landowners would be renumerated for the loss. A
cap1tal gains tax could be complemented with a capital loss benefit.
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This provision appears to be an equitable application of a capital
gains tax and would smooth out land prices fluctuations. Landowners
would be more willing to accept both tax and benefit rather than the
tax by itself. Another advantage of a capital gains tax is that it
would ensure tnat farming adjusted to market signals quickly.
A related policy option is to introduce an enlargement tax.
The intent would De to provide a disincentive to enlargement and an
incentive to intensification on eXisting property. As a policy this is
more restrictive than a capital gains tax because it focuses on the
specific group of enlargers. Moreover, it applies a burden to those
who enlarge out of genuine economic necessity. In support of the
enlargement tax is the idea that lanaownership does not convey
exclusive right to enlargement where such enlargement has adverse
consequences. The policy would allow an enlargement where the tax was
paia, such tax being either paid as part of general taxation or paid to
a local authority. The latter option ensures that regional development
objectives coula be funded thus countering the adverse consequences of
enlargement for the local community.
Finally, there is the option of limiting land aggregation by
applying the provisions of the Commerce Act to agricultural land
purchases. Here the relevant part of the Commerce Act is the scrutiny
given to mergers wnere "any monopoly or 01 igopoly or any circumstances
that are tend; ng to bri ng about any monopoly or 01 i gopoly •..• is or
is likely to be contrary to the public interest. 1I Thus. where any land
transaction resulting in an individual or company acquiring land more
than a specified value woula be scrutinised to see whether the purchase
was justifiea. The value "limit could be set and adjusted yearly. In
effect, this option works in a way similar to the 1952 Act, but would
bring more transactions under scrutiny.
The Commerce Act has not been a major force on company
behaviour. Tne Commerce Bill (1985) significantly changes the rules
for flrms tradlng and provlding services in New Zealand by prohibiting
all restrictive trade practice and merger proposals if they
substantially lessen competition in a market (Cliffe, 1985). The bill
abandons the presumption that certain business practices are legal
until founa to be contrary to the puol;c interest and introduces the
presumption of illegality. The changes in the Commerce Bill are
directed towards strengthening the Commerce Act.
3.8 Closer Settlement Encouraged by Rural Development Policy
Having considered both positive and negative pollcies which
would foster closer settlement, attention is now given to rural
development policies. In New Zealand, and other countries, it is
typically assumed that a healthy agriculture leads to a healthy rural
community. Typically, any rural planning involves a concerted focus on
the proolems associated with agricultural production. There is good
evidence that this assuitJed relationShip between agriculture ana rural
development need not always exist. In understanding this point it can
be appreciated that the objectives of rural aevelopment reqUire
specific policies.
In a dlSCUSSlon of rural depopulation and resettlement, Barker
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and Brown (19S0) note that two New Zealand studies refer to the fact
that a flourishing agriculture was associated with a population
decline. Preswnably. the population decline in part led to adverse
effects on the community. Stronger and more cogent analysis has been
provided for Europe. Wibberly (1984) argues that the concept of the
rural economy as an agricultural one is unrealistic and a handicap to
long-term rural development. Planners and policy makers are reluctant
to accept the existence of a mixed economy with non-agricultural
components. Further. it is not the case that agriculture makes a
direct contribution to rural economies. With agricultural development
there are changes to the landscape. changes in housing needs and
location. and minimum improvements in rural economies and employment.
Wright (1983) makes the same point more emphatically by describing how
some Lincolnshire people perceived that their region was prosperous and
at the same time was 1n decline. Wright shows that separate British
government departments have contrary policies - M.A.F.F. to increase
efficiency and decrease farm numbers, the Development Commission and
the County Councils to diversify employment. In Britain the former has
vastly more funding than the latter. and agricultural policies focus on
productivity by isolating agriculture from the rural community.
At the heart of the problem is the assumed identity of
agricultural policy with rural development policy. Clearly. the two
are not the same and attention must be given to tne latter if there is
genuine concern for rural commun1ty welfare. Also, there must always
be awareness of the off-farm consequences of agricultural policy.
A number of suggestions have been made for rural development
policies. and these are noted here because they relate to closer
settlement. While not specifically resulting in increasingly diverse
landownership they would assist in achieving the objective of closer
settlement.
A first consideration is how other countries have modified
tneir agricultural policy as they have become aware of the rural
development implications of agricultural policy. In the United States
the cl imate of opi ni on has moved away from the traditi ona1 moul d of
agricultural POllCY. The U.S.O.A. has announced a policy of fostering
agriculture and fostering the rural community (Block et al. 1984). The
basis of the policy is the fact that the average farm family depends on
off-farm income for two-thirds of its total annual earnings. Thus
policy makers now recognise that farmers and the rural community
support each other, and that agricultural policy has to focus on both
part-time farmers and the rural community. New policies include
support for rural entrepreneurs by providing both technical and
advisory services. Rural communities will be supported with a national
volunteer programme arawing on the expertise of retired civil servants.
evaluations of local transportation and telephone communications. and
U.S.D.A. support for conservation programmes.
In New Zealand the proportion of part-time farms may be much
less than in the U.S. which suggests that a general rural development
policy such as the above is unwarranted. However. there appear to be
many part-time farms in New Zealana. The best estimate of part-time
farming is the number of paid working owners. leaseholds, and
sharemilKers who work less than 30 hours per week. By 1983 there were
27,7j4 such persons (Agricultural Statistics, 1984) which is 30 percent
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of the total number of paid workers. Although part-time farming has
not been examined in New Zealand, it appears that there are a
consl0erable number of such farmers. Rural development generally, that
is the development of rural industry in conjunction with agriculture,
could provide off-farm sources of income which part-time farmers could
pursue and also full-time farmers or their families at times of
economic stress.
Some existing rural development policies contribute to the
closer settlement objective. For example, a low cost rural settlement
policy in Australia has the oDJective of helping people move back to
rural areas using group ownership of land and some form of community
social organisation. Such a policy is pursued by the Australian Rural
Adjustment Unit (Williams, 1983). Successful schemes are those that
generate an active community life ana involve all age groups. This
policy might relieve urban unemployment and may help Dring labour to
rural areas. One rationale for this policy is to consider the
non-financial returns from work. HOdge (1983) argues that with
increasing unemployment and increasing average income. the necessity
for work to provide for survival declines. Hence, alternative
lifestyles become an attractive option and policies should be directed
towards raising incomes on small farms and decreasing the land area
required to generate an income. The major rational for these schemes
is that alternative life-style farming may be more effective than job
creation schemes.
McDermott (1981) works from the same position but adds that in
the 1980's and 19~Ols rural areas may face a labour shortage. Hence a
rural settlement policy can provide needed agricultural labour and help
relieve urban unemployment. He suggests that communal farms could
provlde farm labour, or large town sections could provide some
self-sufficiency and a source of farm labour.
Of course, it seems that the prevailing farmer viewpoint is to
avoid employing farm labour. However, in part, this response is a
product of prevailing technological responses to production problems.
Farm labour is viewed as expensive and unreliable; machines are more
appropriate. The economic compulsion for the technological choice is
duOious. ~~ survey data show that most farmers who enlarged their
farms said machi nery costs increased at a faster rate than 1abour
costs. Also, there are occasional reports of farmers who do choose
labour over machinery and operate profitably. Crabbe (1978) and Broad
(1984) both discuss cases where this occurs.
Despite the prevailing attitudes in New Zealand, some overseas
attempts at job creation via a rural development policy seem to be
successful (Little, 1964). Apparently, Finland's rural jOb creation
scheme increased the number of jobs by 22 percent in three years.
National policies, government finance and management training all
helped to develop intensive horticulture, fish breeding, wood fuel
prOduction, data processin::1, tourism, farm holidays and forest farming.
The idea of alternative industries is perhaps one way of promoting both
rural development and regional development, and these alternatives may
provide for aadea value to agricultural products. Perhaps those
farmers who enlarge to obtain capital gains or avoid taxation could
achieve the same aDjectives by diversifying into manufacturing or
processing lndustries in their neighbourhood and thus contribute to
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The general point is that agricultural policies per se do not
necessarily foster rural development. In fact, research shows that
agricultural development can be associated with rural decline. It is
important to be aware of all of the consequences of one type of policy
and to pursue rural development policies which can contribute to closer
settlement by proviaing access to land. Other policies which encourage
rural repopulation may also foster closer settlement because rural
dwellers may seek ownership of small areas of land.

CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSION
Tnis paper is intended to promote discussion about
landownership distribution at a time of increasingly concentrated
landownership and at a time of uncertainty regarding land policy.
Despite the current economic problems in agriculture it is relevant to
consider land policy for two reasons. First, it is possible that
economic restructuring in the present period of new agricultural policy
will lead to further farm enlargements. Second, after the present
changes have settled down it is likely that past dynamics in farm
structure will continue and if so, there will be increasing numbers of
both small farms and large farms.
The principle objective has been to promote discussion of the
issues. It is not intended that the policy recommendations are
comprehensive, nor are they completely formulated. The main point is
that the general response to the land concentration issue has to be
given importance because it is this response which governs policy
formulations. The paper presents one position which appears to be
reasonably justified. If some agreement over appropriate position can
be achleved then the task of land policy formation is easier.
Advocates of any position should examine basic assumptions and look for
avenues of agreement in order to avoid doctrinare responses which would
deadlock the debate over land policy.
It must be recognised that this paper favours one perspective
and tends to respond to one other position. The socialist position
gets less attention. Tnese emphases are taken in recognition of the
positions adopted in current policy debates where there is little voice
given to the socialist position. However, the focus on the social
democrat and liberal positions does not mean that the socialist
position is inherently inappropriate.
In terms of the social democrat position, it is wrong to see
the policy options suggested as a cost and a burden on all cltlzens.
t~any of the pol icies woul d have a positive impact on total agricul tural
productivity and have a positive impact on the economy. With changes
in land tenure it is possible to Droaden the distribution of
land-ownership, increase profitability and increase productivity.
Further, minimizing social problems can offer long term savings in
costs which would otherwise be required to adjust and cope with the
adverse consequences of farm enlargement. Neither is it the case that
agriculture would be receiving special attention. Considerable
researCh is devoted to small businesses as the basis to even advanced
economies such as Japan1s. In New Zealand, small businesses are
promoted because they are the major employers of workers. Attention to
closer settlement would parallel the interest in small business.
Finally, one point comes out of this Discussion Paper very
strongly. In many areas important policy decisions have to be made
without basic information on the issue at hand. In particular, we do
not know to what extent economies of size occur under New Zealand
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conditions. Improperly examined is the trade-off between individual
farm efficiency and total productivity. It is not yet clear what the
precise economic mechanism is by which farm enlargement is propelled.
A major research question is the impact of farm enlargement on both
productivlty and rural community. In addition, there are a number of
related topics worthy of research. For example, in New Zealand little
is known about farmers, who owns land, changes in the organization of
production and part-time farming. There are many distributional
issues, which are at the heart of questions of equity and fairness,
about Wl1ich 1ittle is known. It is important to know about changes in
the concentration of landownership, income distribution and the
distribution of benefits and supports i.e., who benefits from
agricultural policy. The distribution of productivity is important
because it would tell what proportion of farms produce what proportion
of total agricultural product, and indicate where policies may be
directed. The historical tendencies and changes in landownership are
poorly studied: do farms undergo a cycle of enlargement and
subdivision as sons mature and then go farming on their own account?
Is there growing concentration of landownership within farming
famil ies? Answers to these research questions would greatly inform any
deliberations over agricultural and land policy. It is essential to
have a gOOd understanding of the nature of agriculture, and from this
foundation of knowledge it is possible to generate enlightened
agricultural policy.
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